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Can robots be moral agents? And why should we care? 
Principle: Humans, not robots, are responsible agents. Robots should be designed; 
operated as far as is practicable to comply with existing laws & fundamental rights & 
freedoms, including privacy.  
This principle highlights the need for humans to accept responsibility for robot 
behaviour and in that it is commendable. However it raises further questions about legal 
and moral responsibility. The issues considered here are (i) the reasons for assuming 
that humans and not robots are responsible agents (ii) whether it is sufficient to design 
robots to comply with existing laws and human rights and (iii) the implications, for 
robot deployment, of the assumption that robots are not morally responsible.   
Keywords: robot, moral agent, embodiment 
 
Introduction 
At first glance, this statement or principle seems convincing. It makes sense to insist 
that humans and not robots are responsible agents.  It usefully reminds us of the limited 
abilities of robots, and provides a helpful antidote to the strong claims and warnings 
sometimes made about them. We should not offload blame for mistakes or bad 
consequences onto robots. Emphasising human responsibility for robot behaviour 
should help to restrict the possible harmful uses to which robots could be put. It also 
makes sense to suggest that robots should be designed and operated to comply with 
existing laws and fundamental rights and freedoms: it is difficult to imagine anyone 
suggesting otherwise. 
But, on further consideration, it becomes apparent that the statement does not 
give any justification for saying that humans and not robots are responsible agents, nor 
does it provide any guidance about where and when robots should be used, or the 
consequences that follow from assuming that robots are not responsible agents. The 
statement raises a number of issues that deserve further discussion. These include 
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important questions about legal responsibility that are not discussed here. The issues 
that will be considered are (a) What are the reasons for assuming that humans and not 
robots are responsible agents? (b) Is it sufficient to design robots to comply with 
existing laws and fundamental rights and freedoms? And (c) If robots are not 
responsible agents, should this limit the roles they are given and the situations in which 
they are deployed?  
  
(a) What are the reasons for assuming that humans and not robots are 
responsible agents? 
Aside from legal responsibility, it is possible to identify two reasons for this 
assumption. The first is based on the difference between biological and mechanical 
machines, and the biological basis of morality. The second is to do with the need for 
society to accept responsibility for the artefacts that humans have produced.   We 
consider both of these in turn.  
 
(i) Biological machines versus Mechanical machines:  The principle states that 
humans and not robots are responsible agents: a statement that can be interpreted as 
implying that robots should not be viewed as moral agents.  This view is not universally 
held: some (e.g. Asaro, 2006; Wallach and Allen, 2009) have argued that moral agency 
should be viewed more as a continuum, and others (e.g. Sullins, 2006) have claimed 
that robots could be full moral agents (if certain conditions were met).   Nonetheless, 
claims that robots are not moral agents, and a belief that they are unlikely to become so 
in the near future, can be grounded in arguments about the biological basis for morality.  
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Patricia Churchland (2011) discusses the basis for morality in living beings, and 
argues that the basis for caring about others lies in the neurochemistry of attachment 
and bonding in mammals.  She explains that it is grounded in the extension of self-
maintenance and avoidance of pain in mammals to their immediate kin.  Neuropeptics, 
R[\WRFLQ DQG DUJLQLQH YDVRSUHVVLQ XQGHUOLH PDPPDOV¶ H[WHQVLRQ RI VHOI-maintenance 
and avoidance of pain to their immediate kin.  Humans and other mammals feel anxious 
about their own well-being and that of those to whom they are attached. As well as 
attachment and empathy for others, humans and other mammals develop more complex 
social relationships, and are able to understand and predict the actions of others.  They 
DOVR LQWHUQDOLVH VRFLDO SUDFWLFHV DQG H[SHULHQFH µVRFLDO SDLQ¶ WULJJHUHG E\ VHSDUDWLRQ
exclusion or disapproval.  As a consequence, humans have an intrinsic sense of justice.  
The same is largely the case for non-human mammals. Bekoff and Pierce (2009) 
provide many examples of evidence of a moral sense of justice in mammals.   For 
example, capuchin monkeys working for treats seemed offended and would refuse to 
cooperate further when they saw that another monkey was given a more desirable 
reward for the same work (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003).  
 
Of course there are differences between humans and mammals in terms of 
morality. Animals are more often described as moral patients than moral agents: but the 
implication here is that the capacity to be a moral patient is necessary for the 
development of moral agency.  Caring about oneself, and extending that care to others, 
forms the basis for the development of morality in humans. 
 
By contrast, robots are not concerned about their own self-preservation or 
avoidance of pain, let alone the pain of others. In part, this can be explained by means 
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of arguing that they are not truly embodied, in the way that a living creature is.  Parts of 
a robot couOGEHUHPRYHGIURPDURERW¶VERG\ZLWKRXWLWVXIIHULQJDQ\SDLQRUDQ[LHW\
let alone it being concerned about damage or pain to a family member or to a human.  A 
living body is an integrated autopoeietic entity (Maturana and Varela, 1980) in a way 
that a man-made machine is not. Of course, it can be argued that the robot could be 
programmed to behave as if it cared about its own preservation or that of others, but this 
is only possible through human intervention.  We return to a further discussion of the 
feasibility of programming morality below.  
 
(ii) Societal responsibility: Johnson and Miller (2008) argue that robots, and other 
FRPSXWDWLRQDODUWHIDFWVDUHQRWIXOOPRUDODJHQWVEHFDXVHWKH\³are not ever completely 
LQGHSHQGHQW IURP WKHLU KXPDQ GHVLJQHUV´ 7KH\ GHVFULEH WKHP DV µKXPDQ-WHWKHUHG¶
artefacts, and argue that responsibility cannot be offloaded onto the artefacts themselves 
since the behaviours and outputs of robots and computer systems necessarily depend on 
human designers and developers. A useful example that they consider is that of a door 
opener.  A person who opens the door for someone carrying a package can be viewed as 
having performed a positive moral act.  But if the door were opened by means of a 
sensor that detects the approach of a person, the mechanical door opener would not be 
considered to have performed a praiseworthy act. Related arguments about a lack of 
independence from human designers have been made in the past based on the way in 
which robots, unlike living machines, can never be considered to be fully embodied, 
since they have always required human intervention and involvement in their 
development (Sharkey and Ziemke, 2001).  The point here is that robots, and their 
underl\LQJ FRQWURO V\VWHPV GHSHQG RQ KXPDQ LQWHUYHQWLRQ  7KH URERWV PD\ EH µVHW
ORRVH¶ WR PDNH XQSUHGLFWDEOH GHFLVLRQV EXW WKH GHFLVLRQ WR DOORZ WKHP WR GR VR LV D
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human and societal one.  Any decisions made by the robot will still depend on their 
initial desLJQ  (YHQ LI WKH URERWV DUH µWUDLQHG¶ RU µHYROYHG¶ WR PDNH GHFLVLRQV WKHLU
training or fitness regime will still have involved human intervention at some point, and 
it is imperative that human responsibility is assumed and recognised.  Johnson (2006) 
makes a useful distinction between moral agents and moral entities, and places robots 
and computer artefacts in the second category.  Moral entities include the artefact 
designer, the artefact, and the artefact user, and moral responsibility cannot be offloaded 
onto the artefact itself. 
 
(b) Is it sufficient to design robots to comply with existing laws and fundamental 
rights and freedoms, including privacy? 
A major problem with the suggestion that robots should be designed to comply 
with existing laws and fundamental rights and freedoms, and the reason that it is not 
sufficient to do so, is that existing laws and human rights have not been formulated with 
technological developments such as robotics in mind.  Although it is important to avoid 
unnecessary multiplication of ethical and regulatory instruments, there does seem to be 
a need to reconsider existing legislation in the light of such developments.  For 
example, robots pose a particular risk to privacy, particularly when they are designed to 
appear as friends and companions and as a result are welcomed into our homes and 
intimate surroundings.  There are many questions here to be answered about the extent 
to which the information they have access to will be accessible to others, and as yet 
little legislation to address this.   Ethical concerns have been expressed about the risks 
of leaving vulnerable older people in the near-H[FOXVLYH µFDUH¶ RI URERWV ZLWK OLWWOH
human contact, (e.g. Sharkey and Sharkey, 2012; Sparrow and Sparrow 2006), but the 
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Human Rights Act does not provide any explicit protection from such a situation.  
6LPLODUFRQFHUQVKDYHEHHQUDLVHGDERXWOHDYLQJFKLOGUHQLQWKHµFDUH¶RIURERWVWRWKH
extent that their attachments to humans are compromised (Sharkey and Sharkey 2010) 
but again there is no legislation or rights that explicitly prevent such a possibility, other 
than that associated with child neglect.  There is an urgent need for something like a 
digital bill of rights to ensure that there is some protection from the situations that could 
arise if humans place robots in positions of power over humans. 
As well as concerns about whether existing legislation provides enough 
protection for humans from robot deployments, there is another set of reasons for 
believing that designing robots to comply with existing laws and fundamental rights and 
freedoms is not sufficient. These reasons are related to the earlier discussions about 
whether robots can be considered to be moral agents. Robots can be programmed with 
sets of rules that determine their behaviour, but this does not mean that they are capable 
of making moral decisions.  When humans make decisions about how to act in social 
situations, they have to do more than follow a set of rules, or laws.  They make 
decisions based on a moral understanding of what it is appropriate or inappropriate for 
them to do.  They are sensitive to feedback about their decisions and their outcomes, 
and can reflect on it and adjust their future decision-making.  
There have been discussions about the extent to which robots can be 
programmed or trained to make the right moral decisions in social situations. Arkin 
(2009), for example, has argued that in a battlefield situation, robot soldiers could be 
programmed to follow a set of rules that would result in more ethical behaviour than 
that sometimes shown by human soldiers in the heat of battle.   His claim is that human 
soldiers can act badly as the result of their emotions ± for instance being motivated by 
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revenge to carry out war crimes.  A robot on the other hand would not respond 
emotionally and could be programmed, by PHDQVRIDQµHWKLFDOJRYHUQRU¶ to evaluate 
actions before carrying them out, and to only perform those previously deemed (by the 
programmers) to be morally permissible.  
Various authors have argued against the idea of being able to program robots to 
make moral decisions.  In the context of autonomous weapons, Christof Heyns, the UN 
Special Rappoteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions has argued 
against the use of autonomous robots to make lethal decisions on the battlefield on the 
EDVLV WKDW URERWV ODFN µKXPDQ MXGJHPHQW FRPPRQ VHQVH DSSUHFLDWLRQ RI WKH ODUJHU
SLFWXUHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKH LQWHQWLRQVEHKLQGSHRSOH¶VDFWLRQVDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
values and anticipation of the direction in which eYHQWV DUH XQIROGLQJ¶ 2013, 
A/HRC/23/ 47).   The point is that the unpredictable variety of social situations that 
could arise on the battlefield means that it is unlikely that a set of pre-programmed rules 
about appropriate responses is likely to be applicable.  
In an interesting paper about the requirements for creating robots with, what 
WKH\ WHUP µPRUDO FRPSHWHQFH¶ 0DOOH DQG 6FKHXW]  DUJXH WKDW DPRQJVW RWKHU
things, robots would require a network of moral norms, in order to know what is and is 
not morally acceptable. They suggest that it would not be practical to program this 
network, and that instead of programming robots with moral norms, they could learn 
and develop a network of moral norms on the basis of feedback given to them in 
response to their actions.  They suggest that it might be necessary to raise the robots in 
KXPDQHQYLURQPHQWVVLQFHWKLVPD\EHµWKHRQO\ZD\WRH[SRVHWKHm to the wealth of 
human moral siWXDWLRQV DQG FRPPXQLFDWLYH LQWHUDFWLRQV¶ 0DOOH DQG 6FKHXW] 
2WKHUV KDYH VXJJHVWHG WKDW URERWV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI ULJKW IURP wrong could be 
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improved by training them on moral stories (Riedl and Harrison, 2016), and requiring 
them to reverse engineer the human values that they represent. 
It is admittedly difficult to rule out the possibility that in the future a robot could 
be trained or raised to be moral, but there are reasons to be sceptical about the 
likelihood of success.  Reasons for scepticism LQFOXGH WKH URERW¶V ODFNRIDELRORJLFDO
basis for morality.  As already discussed, an individual robot does not even care about 
its own body, let alone that of a human ± it would suffer no pain if one of its wheels 
were to be removed for example.  It could only be programmed to respond as if it cared 
about the effects of its actions on a human, or about any censure and moral disapproval 
of its actions.  Another reason for scepticism is the complete lack of any convincing 
examples of robots developing a good, generalisable, understanding of the differences 
between right and wrong.   All there is currently are examples of programmed 
behaviour, such as the robots programmed by Winfield et al (2014) to take actions to 
prevent other robots from falling into a hole, that have been described as exhibiting 
VRPHWKLQJWKDWFDQEHGHVFULEHGDVHWKLFDOEHKDYLRXU%XWWKHXVHRIWKHWHUPµHWKLFDO¶
RUµPRUDO¶LQWKLVFRQWH[WGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWWKHURERWVLQTXHVWLRQFRXOGEHOHJLWLPDWHO\
praised or blamed for their actions.  
 
(c) If robots are not responsible agents, should this limit the roles they are given and the 
situations in which they are deployed?  
 
The original statement that robots are not responsible agents does not spell out what this 
implies for the deployment of robots. It is argued here that there are good reasons to 
 10 
limit the social roles and decision-making powers of robots given their present 
capabilities, and those that are likely in the near future.  As referenced above, Heyns 
(2013) argued that robots should not be allowed to make lethal decisions in battle, partly 
because of their lack of ability to understand social situations, but also because humans 
should have a right to have life and death decisions about them made by fellow humans. 
A related argument could also be made about robot policemen, who could be tasked 
with life and death (or serious injury) decisions away from the battlefield. 
This argument can, and I argue should, be extended further to other kinds of 
decision where robots might restrict the freedoms of humans.  A robot placed in the role 
of a teacher would have to make decisions about situations such as when to punish or 
restrain children, or when to praise them.  A robot carer of older people might have to 
make decisions about when to share personal information about them with other people, 
or when to prevent them from doing something dangerous or risky. A robot nanny 
would have to make similar decision about its young charges.  The point is that all these 
decisions are likely to involve moral judgements and evaluations of social situations, 
and for reasons already discussed the robot is unlikely to be able make good choices.   
Care should be taken to maintain human control, involvement, and responsibility in 
decisions that will affect the lives of humans.  It is crucial that we find ways to ensure 
that robots are not placed in situations, or given social roles, that will result in allowing 
WKHPWRPDNHPRUDOGHFLVLRQVWKDWZLOODIIHFWSHRSOH¶VOLYHVThere are already risks of 
automated decisions affecting our lives, but robots that can be given the appearance of 
competent social actors make these risks even more prevalent. 
Summary:   It is easy to agree with the EPSRC principle about robots not being 
responsible agents, but this brief consideration finds it to be insufficient to guide future 
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action.  It does not refer to any reasons for claiming that robots are not responsible 
agents, nor consider the implications for the deployment of robots and for human 
choices about the social roles they should be given.  At present, and in the near future, 
even when efforts are made to program robots to follow the law and to respect 
indiYLGXDOV¶ULJKWVDQGIUHHGRPthose robots are not going to be able to understand 
social situations and consequently will not be able to consistently make the right moral 
decisions about human social situations. It is therefore important to avoid placing robots 
in social roles and situations in which moral decisions are required.  Care should be 
taken to avoid or minimise automatic and algorithmic decision making in situations in 
which human judgement is required.  Even greater care is needed in the case of robots 
that create the illusion that they understand.  Humans do sometimes make flawed 
decisions, but they can reflect and learn from them and develop a better moral 
understanding in a way that a robot cannot. 
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